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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
The present thesis deals with the conflict between two fundamental rights of 
immense importance within the European Union, namely the right to the protection of 
personal data that derives from the vital right to privacy, against the right to freedom of 
expression.  It begins with a brief description of the need for the adoption of the General 
Data Protection Regulation in the new modern era we live in, which is characterized by 
constant technological developments. An explanatory summary of “Privacy” and “Data 
Protection” and their safeguarding as two distinguished values will follow. Moreover, 
since this thesis will mainly focus on the conflict between the right to the protection of 
personal data and the right to freedom of expression, at the next stage the paper 
analyzes the concept of data protection and the basic notions, which the reader should 
be aware of for being able to understand this paper. Thereafter, the notion of freedom 
of expression and its notorious necessity in society shall be approached. Consequently, 
this thesis will investigate the different cases in which various European Courts have 
dealt with the conflict of the above rights and how they have set the priority of those to 
reach a fair balancing among them. Finally, it describes the interconnection of the 
abovementioned for reaching a comprehensive conclusion.  
 
 
Antigoni Georgiou 
11/12/2019 
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Preface 
The purpose of this dissertation is to approach the conflict between two 
fundamental rights of equal respect, the right to the protection of personal data and the 
right to freedom of expression, and the aim is to try to find a fair balancing among them. 
The GDPR era we live in along with the massive development of technology, and the 
easy expansion of media, increased this collision. That is the reason that motivated me 
to investigate the reconciliation of the right to privacy and the right freedom of 
expression in the GDPR era. The legal  dogmatic  methodology  is employed  in  the  
research.  The sources for this thesis consist of legislation, case laws, academic journals 
and interpretative works, such as the opinion issued by the Article 29 Working Party/ 
European Data Protection Board. 
 
At this point, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my supervisor 
Assist. Prof. Dr. Komninos Komnios that without his expertise and knowledge, the 
completion of this thesis could not have been possible. His willingness to advise and 
guide me whenever I needed, played a decisive role in this outcome. Furthermore, I 
would like to thank my family who believed in me during my studies and encouraged me 
in every step. Their love and pursuit were all I needed to achieve this goal.
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Introduction 
Respecting human dignity and human rights, as well as safeguarding democratic 
society, liberty, fairness, and equal treatment are the main principles among European 
Union.1  Within these principles and on the way to achieve them, exists the protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms, highlighting the right to respect private life (or 
privacy), the right to data protection and freedom of expression, vital rights for a 
sustainable society.2  
The fundamental right of privacy is often being confused with the right of data 
protection.3 Indeed, these rights are deemed to be the same because of their 
interconnection, but in fact they are distinguished values, protected separately within 
the Union.4 This paper will briefly summarize the aforementioned difference and then 
focus on the new standards of the right to data protection which plays an important role 
in our modern era. 
However, considering that privacy and data protection are not standing alone as 
fundamental rights protected in the European Union, a high debate follows; this is 
whether those are absolute rights that can set limits to other fundamental rights. In this 
paper though, our consideration will be the conflict of privacy and data protection with 
the right to freedom of expression.5  
This rapid changing era we live in accompanied by massive technological 
developments, creates challenges in our basic freedoms and fundamental rights; the 
dominant position of the internet in our everyday life affected the protection of private 
life of individuals and the processing of their personal data.6 Nowadays, because of this 
worldwide spreading of information technology, it is hard to limit the surveillance of 
                                                 
1 Fact Sheets on the European Union, The protection of fundamental rights in the EU, European 
Parliament, 2019: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_4.1.2.pdf>, accessed 1/10/2019  
2 European Data Protection Supervisor, Data Protection, <https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-
protection_en>,  accessed 01 October 2019  
3 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), page 18 
4 European Data Protection Supervisor, Data Protection,  <https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-
protection_en>, accessed 01 October 2019 
5 Kotsalis L./Menoudakos K, General Data protection Regulation(GDPR), (Law Library 2018), page 70 
6 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), page 30 
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every kind of internet platforms, search engines, and public media that observe every 
online activity.7 This created a dilemma on how to tackle the situation that arose, taking 
into account the rights of both private interests and governmental ones, since this data 
processing affects social and economic activities.8 As a result, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR/ Regulation) has been adopted by the European Union to 
provide further protection of individuals’ privacy.9 Since 1995 and before that adoption, 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (Directive) was in place, providing harmonization of 
human rights in respect of their data processing and eliminating the borders for data 
transfer across the European Union.10 However, albeit the aim of the Directive to 
harmonize data protection standards, the adoption of different national laws by the 
Member States (MS) ended to a patchwork of laws, failing thus to comply with the 
Directive’s objectives.11 Alongside, the Directive could not fit our digital era since it left 
many things uncovered because of the expeditious technological development. As the 
world is evolving, it arises the need of updating almost every legal text that surrounds 
us. The solution seemed to be the GDPR, that is directly applicable to each MS. It came 
into force on 25 May 2018, after heavy lobbying to replace the Directive and raise the 
level of protection of personal data and legal certainty.12 The GDPR follows the same 
line as the Directive but this direct application of it, promotes harmonization across the 
European Union regaining the trust that the fundamental rights are protected by a single 
pan-European law that can face the challenges of today in a consistent way.13 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Human Rights Working Group,The Human Right to Privacy and Personal Data Protection: Local-to-
Global Governance in the Digital Era, 2016 Research Project Human Rights Working Group, Law Schools 
Global League Preparatory Document for LSGL Academic Conference, 2016, 
<https://lawschoolsgloballeague.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Human-Rights-Group-Paper-
2016.pdf>, accessed 02 October 2019 
8 Ibid 
9 Voigt, Paul/von dem Bussche, Axel, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), (Springer 2017), 
page 2 
10 Ibid  
11 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), page 30 
12 Voigt, Paul/von dem Bussche, Axel, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), (Springer 2017), 
page 2 
13 Ibid  
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CHAPTER 1: PRIVACY vs DATA PROTECTION  
1.1 Is the Right to Privacy the same with the Right to Personal Data Protection? 
As aforementioned, we live in the GDPR era, where enterprises face new 
obligations referring to the protection of personal data in the light of the Regulation, but 
to define its scope of application, we need to specify a crucial part that leads to 
confusion and is essential for applying the GDPR. So here comes the question; is it 
privacy a synonym of personal data?  
The right to privacy, according to William O. Douglas, an American jurist, and 
politician, is “the beginning of all Freedoms”14, and it has various dimensions and 
plentiful concepts.15 Indeed, this essential right could be considered as the root of 
multiple other freedoms branching the tree of fundamental rights.16 The right to privacy 
is protected not only in the European Convention of Human rights (ECHR) but also in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (the Charter).17 Apart from UDHR, which is recognized on an 
international level and it is protected against any intrusion, the right to privacy seems to 
be a major concern in the European Union as well. Apparently, through the article 8 of 
ECHR, which lies down the right to respect privacy, we can realize that the first part of it 
safeguards private life, family life, home and correspondence from any unwarranted 
interference, and having the second part of it specifying that this right is not absolute, 
but it is subject to the exceptions provided.18  Moreover, the Charter, is identical in 
substance with the ECHR in article 7, providing in the next article(art.8) another 
fundamental right corresponding to the right of privacy, the right to the protection of 
personal data, which will be discussed subsequently.19 The right to private life is 
protected under the constitution of each European country, and as a Cypriot citizen, I 
will briefly refer to article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus which also 
                                                 
14 Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak [1952], 343 U.S. 451 
15 Privacy Information Basics: The Importance of Privacy, Royal Roads University, 
<http://libguides.royalroads.ca/c.php?g=642866&p=4503946>, accessed 02 October 2019 
16 Human Rights, Views & Info, Privacy International, “The Right To Privacy And Why It Matters”, 2015, 
<https://rightsinfo.org/the-right-to-privacy-and-why-it-matters/>, accessed 02/10/2019 
17 European Data Protection Supervisor, Data Protection,  <https://edps.europa.eu/data-
protection/data-protection_en>, accessed 01 October 2019 
18 European Convention on Human Rights [1950] ETS 5, art 8, paras 1-2 
19 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] C326/02, art 7-8 
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protects private and family life against any interference, unless it is provided by law.20 
Article 15, derives from the European and International legislation having as a subject 
matter to safeguard and promote autonomous development of an individual’s 
personality from any intrusion.21 The article 15.1 also includes the protection of personal 
data from unauthorized access, and this was implemented in the case Johanna 
Kyprianou v. The Republic of Cyprus where the Supreme Court of Cyprus ruled that 
personal belongings of the individuals are a matter of their private life and any disclosure 
of them challenges the given protection.22 
During the times, the right to privacy gained numerous interpretations, but one 
that summarizes the concept of privacy protection is defined as the right to be let 
alone.23 Having the individuals’ privacy protected is interlinked with having their 
autonomy, being able to decide which parts of their everyday life they want to keep 
away from the public eye and intrusion.24 In respect of this right, they are the controllers 
of their feelings, thoughts, and habits, having the freedom to choose whether, or with 
whom they will communicate and what to share with. As the owners of their existence, 
they can make the decisions that surround their home or even their body.25 In any case, 
we must not confuse the meaning of private life with a lonely or isolated life, precluding 
any other person from the private environment of the individuals; but the interpretation 
must include the right to be able to socialize with others that are not in their private 
sphere.26 In a democratic society, privacy is vitally important for the individuals in 
implementing their duty as citizens while keeping their identity.27 
Undoubtedly, the right to privacy in the new challenging digital era has been 
enriched to meet the new standards of emerging technological developments.28 
                                                 
20 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus [1960], art 15 
21 Paraskeva, Costas, Cyprus Constitutional law: Fundamental Rights&Freedoms, (2015 Law Library), page 
237 
22 Johanna Kyprianou v. The Republic of Cyprus through the Attorney General and others [2006],  
1920/2006 
23 Warren, Samuel/Brandeis, Louis, "The Right to Privacy", Harvard Law Review 1890, page 193 
24 Law. J. (2015) Oxford Dictionary of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
25 Human Rights, Views & Info, Privacy International, “The Right To Privacy And Why It Matters”, 2015, 
<https://rightsinfo.org/the-right-to-privacy-and-why-it-matters/>, accessed 02 October 2019 
26 Paraskeva, Costas, Cyprus Constitutional law, Fundamental Rights & Freedoms (2015 Law Library), page 
239-240 
27 Ibid 
28 Human Rights, Views & Info, Privacy International, “The Right To Privacy And Why It Matters, 2015, 
<https://rightsinfo.org/the-right-to-privacy-and-why-it-matters/>, accessed 02 October 2019  
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Therefore, data protection has been found as an aspect of privacy, an explicit right for 
personal data protection, which in some legal texts is protected as a distinguished 
fundamental right, but some legal orders include it in the broad definition of privacy.29 
Although protection of personal data can be inferred from the right to privacy, it 
concerns us every time that personal data are being processed, regardless of the effect 
on privacy;30 that is the reason that it has gained a separated protection in the European 
legal order that started in the 1970s aiming to limit the intrusion of the government and 
some companies, in processing personal data.31 
The right to privacy and the right to data protection are often being confused as 
indistinguishable values, because the two of them aim to the self-determination of 
individuals’ personality, retaining their morals, and being able to create their characters, 
express themselves and feel free, have their own beliefs without any coercion or 
pressure and develop relationships according to their likes.32 As mentioned above, the 
right to protect personal data is protected under article 8 of the Charter, apart from the 
right to privacy, and we can distinguish the two rights by their sphere of application, 
their composition, and their objective.33 The guarantee of the right in article 8, is 
accompanied by the basic values of the protection of personal data as well as how and 
when they can be processed.34 On that account by identifying the different concepts of 
those two rights, we conceive the right to data protection is a novelty right, which is into 
play nowadays and creates a system of protection of processing personal data by 
checking and balancing them. This processing system for being legitimate must be in 
accordance with indispensable prerequisites, and therefore we recognize the high 
protection that personal data have been obtained.35 By contrast, the right to privacy, 
which comes into play whenever the individuals suffer a detriment in their private life 
or their personal interest, constitutes a general constraint in any intrusion that is not 
                                                 
29 Flaherty, D., Protecting privacy in surveillance societies: The federal republic of Germany, Sweden, 
France, Canada, and the United States, 1989, Chapel Hill, U.S.: The University of North Carolina Press 
30 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), pages 18-19 
31 Ibid   
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid  
34 Ibid  
35 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), page 20 
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justified under the public interest exception.36 Combinatorically, the term of private life 
gained broad interpretation taking into account each case’s facts to decide whether an 
intrusion exists and if it is justified.37 
Considering the above, the right to respect private life and the right to protect 
personal data are fundamental values safeguarded under EU Law, but of different 
substance even though they are sometimes confused as the same. Yet, both are not 
absolute rights, and they must be reconciled with other Human Rights or be restricted 
under certain situations; a fair balance with the other fundamental freedoms is 
mandatory.38 As said at the beginning, this thesis focuses on data protection and its 
conflict with the right to freedom of expression. Therefore, the following sections will 
explain in detail those two notions before trying to strike a balance between them.   
CHAPTER 2: PERSONAL DATA  
2.1 Protection of Personal Data 
As discussed previously, the concept of personal data arises from the notion of 
privacy and together are crucial rights in retaining and boosting human rights and 
integral values; not only that, without their protection many other fundamental rights 
would not have standing.39 The need for protection of personal data comes from the 
objective of avoiding their processing beyond what is essential, taking into account a 
proportionate, fair and legitimate aim on doing so.40 In other words, data protection 
ensures their legal use, collection and, storage.41 
 
2.2 Definition of Personal Data 
Personal data is defined as every information that alone or with other 
information can lead to the identification of a natural person, directly or indirectly.42 
                                                 
36 Ibid  
37 Ibid  
38 European Data Protection Supervisor, Data Protection,  <https://edps.europa.eu/data-
protection/data-protection_en>, accessed 01 October 2019 
39 Ibid, accessed 12 October 2019 
40 Ibid  
41 Ibid  
42 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016], OJ L 119, art 4  
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Taking the exact wording, that information must be personal.43 As the law states 
‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’)”44. That means, a piece of information alone or different pieces 
of information collected together, that can identify an individual, is considered personal 
data. So, the core of what personal data is, stands the identification of the data subject; 
at the point in which we can no longer conceive the identity of the data subject, we no 
longer refer to personal data within the meaning of GDPR.  We can find a wide range of 
what personal data is and there is not an ending, as jurisprudence adds more to what is 
deemed to be personal data according to each case that may be presented. A few 
examples of what is considered to be personal data are names, photos, location data, 
email address, home address, phone number, online ID, date of birth, ID number and 
any other unique characteristics indicating “physical, physiological, genetic, psychic, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person”.45 The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) defined what personal data is in the Case C-582/14 Patrick 
Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, a milestone decision, which follows the 
Directive’s definition in article 2(a) that is the same as the one adopted in GDPR. 
Although the Court was based on the Directive and its scope, in its interpretation it 
considered the present situation of modern society and the digitalization of the era.46 IP 
addresses, albeit dynamic, according to the ruling of the CJEU, constitute personal data 
in the hands of the third party under specific conditions. The prerequisites for adopting 
the pre-mentioned is when those IP addresses, in conjunction with additional 
information, can lead to the identification of the person.47 This can be considered as an 
indirect identification of the individual.48 As said by the CJEU, the reasonable 
identification of a data subject can happen even when another third party has and can 
provide legally that additional information to the website operator.49 
                                                 
43 Voigt, Paul/von dem Bussche, Axel, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), (Springer 2017), 
page 11 
44 Ibid  
45 Ibid  
46 Case C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2016] 
47 Ibid  
48 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), page 91 
49 Ibid  
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Moreover, subject to special protection under GDPR is, as they called, the 
sensitive personal data, a sub-category of personal data. Their sensitivity arises from the 
fact that if they are processed, the data subject might face risks, so their protection must 
be increased. Also, their processing can happen only under certain prerequisites.50 
 
2.3 Processing of Personal Data 
Defining whether personal data are subject to protection, we must be aware of 
the notion of “processing”. As the law says, it is any procedure connected to personal 
data and can happen either with automated means or by humans.51 The operation that 
means processing, could be to collect the personal data of an individual, store them, 
alter them, put them in a structure, organize, or just record them. The procedure that 
could mean processing is a non-ending list which also contains the usage, the disclosure 
or deletion.52 Each case is unique, and the court will interpret the situation broadly. 
 To sum up, data protection nowadays is crucial as technological developments 
and globalization have an adverse effect on the processing of personal data. The massive 
data collection and their public sharing in a reckless way created the need for this further 
protection as it is being challenged by the constant changes of our digitalized era. This 
rapid changing world thus, generated the need for a more stable and sound system for 
personal data protection. Yet, the right to the protection of personal data and the right 
to privacy are not absolute rights and they may conflict with other human rights and 
European values. The most common interaction with personal data protection appears 
to be with the right to freedom of expression; therefore, it is necessary to reconcile with 
it, but also with the other fundamental rights and find a fair balance between them.53 
 
                                                 
50 Ibid, page 96 
51 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119, art 4 para 2 
52 Ibid  
53 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), page 24  
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CHAPTER 3: THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Over the years and the evolution of our world in every aspect of life, the need 
for more intensive protection of Human Rights is manifest in order to improve the 
welfare of European citizens. One of the main elements of an effective democratic 
society is freedom of expression that not only enriches the liberty of a sustainable State 
but also is interlinked with the protection of other fundamental rights.54 Lacking this 
right we may lead to adverse effects and nations of coercion, thus it gains protection on 
an international level.55 According to the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of Lingens 
v. Austria the Court, noting the necessity of freedom of expression, stated that for a 
democratic society it is found to be one of the most important elements for 
development and creation of the path in the “self-fullfilment of human beings”.56  
As said in article 19 of the Cypriot Constitution, freedom of expression is found 
among the crucial rights in maintaining democracy, and it has a decisive role in the 
progress of the personality and spirituality of individuals.57 Freedom of expression is 
guaranteed under article 10 of the ECHR and article 11 of the Charter, safeguarding the 
individual’s right to freely express opinions; a nearly absolute right. It is the right to 
collect and transmit information and ideas in the absence of any state intrusion.58 The 
extension of this right is wide and includes any expression irrespective of its subject-
matter.59 The second part of the aforementioned is the most essential component in 
order to maintain democracy and political progress in every nation.60 Nevertheless, the 
article sets out the situations that allow restrictions on the exercise of the right and that 
                                                 
54 Bychawksa – Siniarska, Dominika, Protecting the Right to Freedom of Expression Under the European 
Convention of Human Rights, Council of Europe, (July 2017), <https://rm.coe.int/handbook-freedom-of-
expression-eng/1680732814>, accessed 20 October 2019 
55 Heller, Brittan/van Hoboken, Joris, Freedom of Expression: A Comparative Summary of United States 
and European Law, (May 2019), The Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University Vrije 
Universiteit Brussels and University of Amsterdam, 
<https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/TWG_Freedom_of_Expression.pdf>, accessed 20 October 
2019 
56 Lingens v Austria [1986] 8 EHRR 407  
57 Paraskeva, Costas, Cyprus Constitutional law: Fundamental Rights&Freedoms, (2015 Law Library), page 
296 
58 Bychawksa – Siniarska, Dominika, Protecting the Right to Freedom of Expression Under the European 
Convention of Human Rights, Council of Europe, July 2017, <https://rm.coe.int/handbook-freedom-of-
expression-eng/1680732814>, accessed 20 October 2019 
59 Synodinou, Tatiana-Eleni/Jougleux, Philippe/Markou, Christiana/Prastitou, Thalia, The Eu Internet Law, 
Regulation and Enforcement, (Springer 2017), page 377 
60 Ibid  
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any interference can happen only when these are lawful and unavoidable.61 We cannot 
disregard the provisions laid down in the second paragraph of the said article, stating 
that the right to freedom of expression bears duties and responsibilities. Those 
obligations deriving by it, set limits to that right once other fundamental rights come 
into play. However, nowadays that massive independence of transmitting information 
through media can create a hazard when disclosing sensitive facts, especially of public 
persons, coming into conflict with the right to protect private life.62 Hence, any activity 
based on the article, namely freedom of press, surfing websites, access to information 
and much more, must be in a fair balance with other fundamental rights that may strike 
with; and as mentioned before, a main struggle is with the right to private life, which 
consequently is extended to personal data protection, especially in our digital era. Due 
to this, a core question occurs: “Can private life set limits to freedom of expression?” 
CHAPTER 4: ARTICLE 85 GDPR 
As already stated, the right to the protection of personal data as well as freedom 
of expression are both fundamental rights that are subject to protection under European 
Law and are indispensable values for a democratic society. But the problem comes to 
the surface when those two rights must face each other, and a conflict is unavoidable. 
Which one should prevail or be protected?  
The GDPR in order to find a common link between those two rights, introduced 
article 85 which aims to find a fair balance in exercising them.63 This article leaves the 
discretion to the MS to define what is deemed to be the right balance;64 which may 
mean that while a MS allows the processing of specific data to enable freedom of 
expression and information to be exercised, another MS may forbid this.65 More 
                                                 
61 Ibid  
62 Paraskeva, Costas, Cyprus Constitutional law: Fundamental Rights&Freedoms, (2015 Law Library), page 
304 
63 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data 
Protection Law, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), page 56 
64 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119, art 85 
65 Gabel, Detlev/Hickman, Tim, Chapter 17: Issues subject to national law – Unlocking the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, April 2019, <https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-17-issues-
subject-national-law-unlocking-eu-general-data-protection>, accessed 24 October 2019 
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precisely, MS have the right to deviate from specific sections of GDPR to find a balance 
for the abovementioned rights for reasons of journalism, expression through arts and 
literature or academic expression, as long as they are essential.66 The justification for 
allowing MS to have the margin of appreciation is based on the differences in each legal 
order and the special interpretation of the nations for what freedom of expression is 
and specifically journalism. Furthermore, recital 153 of GDPR provides more exact 
explanations for possible exceptions by the nations with a view to ensure a higher 
standard for the protection of freedom of expression, emphasizing again the need of 
striking a balance between the fundamental rights. Thus, MS must provide any 
exemptions and derogations in their legislation that are necessary to achieve this 
balance, according to their unique needs.67  
Cyprus, consequently, to conform with GDPR rules of article 85, adopted article 
29 of Law 125(I)/2018.68 To comply with the discretion given, the Cypriot legislator laid 
the aforementioned article stating that in the case of data processing linked with 
criminal convictions and offences, and also processing personal data or sensitive 
personal data when is performed for the need of expression in any form (such as 
journalism, arts, and literature or academic aims), this processing is allowed.69 
Nevertheless, this permission for processing is subject to certain conditions; it must 
respect the principle of proportionality and also the fundamental rights and freedoms 
under the European Union that provides their safeguarding.70 Also, the Law refers to 
articles 14 and 15 of the Regulation, noting that if they interfere with the right to 
freedom of expression and information or journalistic integrity, they will not be 
applicable.71 Due to the recent adoption of this Law, it has not been used extensively 
yet, but as we find ourselves in the GDPR era, it will be subject to consideration in many 
upcoming cases. 
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Interpreting article 85, we recognize that the Regulation adopts the idea that 
freedom of expression and the right to the protection of personal data are equivalent 
rights and that is the reason that there is an overriding requirement to find a balance 
between them; none of the two rights is prevailing over the other and in every judgment 
there must be a consideration of the special facts of each case. What is considered as a 
right or fair balance is intricate and the GDPR gave the authority to national courts to 
define the fairness in that matter.72 Ever since the beginning of the existence of the two 
rights the jurisprudence of the courts was contradicting and in order to balance the 
rights to data protection and freedom of expression, a careful examination of the 
judgment of each court in the different cases must be done. In respect of the above, the 
next chapter will be divided into three parts; How the CJEU addressed the above conflict, 
the findings of the ECtHR when the rights to data protection and freedom of expression 
were at stake, and the final part will be the balancing by the Cypriot Data Protection 
Commissioner of those Fundamental Freedoms. 
CHAPTER 5: PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA vs FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
5.1 The approach of the CJEU  
5.1.1 Case Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy 
and Satamedia Oy (C-73/07) 
As mentioned above, according to the reconcilement of freedom of expression 
and the right to data protection, the jurisprudence of the courts varies; a case-by-case 
assessment must be done for this balancing exercise. One of the landmark cases where 
the CJEU examined the conflict between the above was the case Tietosuojavaltuutettu 
v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy. This case took place before the 
creation of the GDPR and the CJEU was based on the Directive that was in force at that 
time.73 Nevertheless, having in mind the similarities of the Directive with the Regulation, 
the Court could act similarly today. 
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The facts of the case are as follows. In Finland, two existed enterprises, named 
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy,were owned by the same person. 
Those companies were collecting tax data that were available in a public domain and 
they were aiming to publicize that tax information in a local newspaper. Following that, 
Satamedia started providing those tax information through an SMS service.74 Data 
Protection Ombudsman of Finland required the termination of this service by 
Satakunnan and Satamedia, arguing that this was a violation of the right to protect 
personal data.75 The companies refused to comply with the request, arguing that an 
exception existed to the Data Protection Act of Finland and in particular, the journalistic 
exception.  In accordance, the Data Protection Board dismissed the request for stopping 
the service because it was challenging the right to freedom of expression as provided by 
the act. Following this, the Ombudsman appealed, and the case reached the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling, asking for the interpretation of “journalism”, under the Act.76 
First of all, to define if there was a fundamental right in challenge, the CJEU 
reassured that what the two companies were doing, was processing of personal data 
under article 3 of the Directive, irrespective of the fact that the given information was 
publicly available.77 The CJEU pointed out the necessity of freedom of expression for a 
democratic society and thus the interpretation of any activity within this right should be 
interpreted widely. On the other side, as ruled, exemptions from the right for the 
protection of personal data are notoriously limited to what is inevitable.78 Defining thus 
the notion of journalistic activities, the court ruled that the service could be considered 
as described only “if their object is the disclosure to the public of information, opinions 
or ideas, irrespective of the medium used to transmit them.”79 Also the CJEU noted that 
journalism is not restricted to media companies but to every individual that is 
committed in journalistic activities and can act that way, either having a profit or not.80 
At the same time the CJEU left the final decision to the national court to define whether 
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those activities could be undertaken as journalistic.81 In light of this, the Finish Supreme 
Court applying the CJEU ruling, ordered the two companies to cease the service. Hence, 
the companies alleging infringement to their freedom of expression referred to the 
ECtHR,82 but the ECtHR following the CJEU’s preliminary ruling, even if it found 
interference within the right to freedom of expression, stated that this interference was 
justified.83 Although there was a violation in the right of imparting information, banning 
their collection and processing, was legal, essential and legitimate. As the ECtHR 
explained, the legitimate purpose that allows derogations in the right of freedom of 
expression, existed under Data Protection, is to protect the rights of others or their 
fame.84 Moreover, the necessity subject to a democratic society was not justified, as the 
exception stands only when a public interest exists, but in this case, the massive amount 
of information collected exceeded the substance of journalistic activities. As the ECtHR 
ruled, the notion of journalism includes purposes of disseminating information and in 
this case, this was not the fact as the activities of the two companies aimed only to calm 
the thirst of the society about the tax information of others. The ultimate goal of ECtHR 
was to seek a balance between freedom of expression and the right to the protection of 
personal data and provide guidance to national courts in this matter.85 
In conclusion, the ECtHR to its ruling noted that the public interest was driven by 
the curiosity of third parties, interfering thus in the private life of others. In this case, 
the personal data protection prevailed, as the interference found in the fundamental 
right of freedom of expression was justified and legitimate.86 As it stands, despite the 
fact that the jurisprudence in this case happened before the creation of GDPR, the court 
would have reached the same results because of the existence of similar interpretations; 
the bridge in article 85 of GDPR between data protection and freedom of expression 
states that the discretion for finding a balance among the striking rights, it is up to the 
MS. Likewise, back then the findings for a justified interference in the right to freedom 
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of expression are a result of the strict explanation of journalistic activities and the broad 
discretion of national bodies.87 
 It was inevitable that the ruling of the CJEU and ECtHR, would generate criticism 
and questioning whether there was a proper balance between the conflicting 
fundamental rights that deserve special protection. The complexity of the case and the 
need for equal respect of the two rights leads to different perspectives on how to 
reconcile freedom of expression with the protection of personal data. The biggest 
concern of some is that the data which generated the conflict was already publicly 
available, and the applicants used those published data. As a result, what they did was 
just to circulate the taxation data and facilitate their access. The taxation data were 
already disclosed for transparency reasons under the Finish Law and nevertheless, the 
actions of the two companies would not be able to cause further damage to privacy 
protection.88 Taking the above into consideration, if people were unaware of the court’s 
ruling and interpretation, they could lean in favour of the applicants and the existence 
of a violation of their right to collect and process already publicly available information; 
thus a breach of article 10 ECHR. However, this is not the case. In reading the court’s 
decision, there was a clear understanding of the delicacy of this matter, and when 
striking a balance, powerful grounds must exist. The court reasonably explained that 
having those data publicly available does not extract the individuals’ protection for 
maintaining their privacy.89 Such massive collection and publication of data went 
beyond the essential and the public interest consideration diminished, as curiosity 
arose.90 As said, the purpose of the publication could not be deemed anymore as 
journalistic as it did not contribute to the public interest.91 Hence, there was lack of 
violation of the applicant’s rights. In conclusion, as we can assume from the above study, 
priority is given to the right of personal data protection. This is obvious because the 
Directive provides for a default standard, and derogations on that can happen only 
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under special exemptions; and in the above case, the exemption of journalism could not 
be justified.  
 
5.1.2 Google Spain SL Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD) Mario Costeja González 
Another landmark case referring to the conflict of data protection and privacy 
versus Freedom of expression was examined in the well-known case “Google v. Spain”. 
In this case the complainant, Mr. Gonzalez requested from a newspaper, Google Spain 
and Google Inc. to delete personal data that were related to his name, revealing financial 
problems. The publication that was found on the search results to Mr. Gonzalez’s name, 
was involving his house in auction proceedings, although terminated years ago. On that 
base, Mr. Gonzales asked for the erasure of the aforementioned announcements as they 
were irrelevant and inaccurate, and thus interfering with his fundamental rights of 
privacy and data protection.92 The Data Protection Authority upheld only the claim 
regarding Google and subsequently ordered them to delete the links to make those data 
inaccessible.93 Therefore, Google Spain and Google Inc. appealed, and the case was 
found before CJEU to clarify the questions that arose. Among others, the CJEU made 
clear that in our digital era, data controllers must keep the data protected, in a way that 
they ensure to the data subjects the safeguarding of their fundamental rights, following 
the Directive’s obligations.94 The search engines, as processors, must comply with their 
legal responsibilities without exceeding the essential and preserve precise data in their 
publications. As the identification of the data subject is possible in our age because of 
the technological boom, the details provided must comply with the law. Meaning, the 
processing of personal data is possible when legitimate interest exists by third parties or 
the data processor or controller, and if it is compulsory to succeed the purpose needed. 
Yet, this is not absolute,it must be balanced with other conflicting rights of the 
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individual.95 Considering this, the sensitive nature of Mr. Gonzalez’s data and as the 
bankruptcy proceedings happened years ago and did not have a legal basis anymore 
because his house was repossessed, there was no legitimate interest for the processing 
at the time when Mr. Gonzales objected to the announcements.96 On the grounds of the 
CJEU findings, search engines like Google, which determine how and why personal data 
will be processed, are regarded as controllers and not just processors, and they are 
obliged to comply with the right to personal data protection and erase any data that are 
outdated, or they no longer have legitimate interest.97 And the question that stands, 
keeping in mind the CJEU’s ruling is if the data subject has the right to object, “the right 
to be forgotten”. The individuals unquestionably under the Directive 95/46 have the 
explicit right not to accept the exposure of their personal data and if the data are already 
disclosed, under specific circumstances, they can request the removal of data containing 
their personal information.98 This legitimate interest of individuals comes into play 
whenever that information is “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive 
in relation to the purposes of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the 
search engine”99. Hence, this is a qualified right that arises from the right of privacy and 
personal data protection and must be reconciled with other fundamental rights. In the 
abovementioned case, a balance must be sought with the right of freedom of 
expression, and more precisely with the right to be informed.100 Consequently, this 
enactment provides a right to the data subject and a duty for the controllers, which yet 
must strike the right balance based on the analysis of the facts of each case. The 
harmonization of the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and information by 
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having the right to access them, with the right to the protection of privacy and personal 
data protection is problematic as both rights are subject to equal respect.101 The 
disclosed information is one of the thoughts that must be considered when the courts 
try to reach a fair balance. What is important regarding the information, is their effect 
on the private life of the data subject and how sensitive that information is in terms of 
this. Furthermore, the public interest is another factor which determines, when in 
question, whether a piece of information could be a subject for objection; if there is no 
public interest in the given case, the right to reveal any information will be set aside 
before the right to personal data protection. However, if the information is related to 
public persons or has a public interest, it can justify access without violating the human 
right of privacy.102  
This significant case was also subject to a lot of criticism for the lack of addressing 
the consequences to the right of freedom of expression.103 Yet, having studied the case, 
the right to be forgotten of the data subjects, the right to object and the right to have 
their data erased from search engines such as Google, go hand in hand with the right of 
freedom of expression and information. Despite that the CJEU focused on the 
implications regarding the existence or not of public interest, having a search engine 
operator, which is today the main actor in disseminating information, extraction of this 
right from it, following the fundamental right of individuals to protect their personal 
data, is just as simple as that; we again find in conflict the right to freedom of expression 
and the right to data protection. Search engines can be accessed from anywhere in the 
world and the deletion of publicized information from those engines,  takes away their 
right to inform and consequently their right to freedom of expression. Thus, the 
balancing must be adequate and powerfully reasonable. Forgetting the public interest 
issue in that case, I consider that the right to the protection of personal data would and 
should prevail. As extensively said, a case-by-case analysis must be done, and in Google 
case, Mr. Gonzalez had overriding rights against the search engines.104 The sensitivity of 
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the information linked to his name speaks for itself, especially in the GDPR era and its 
deriving obligations, where data subjects must be respected and protected, yet not 
absolutely; a balance must be sought. Nevertheless, the CJEU may not have focused on 
the implications to the right of freedom of expression but noted that controllers of such 
search engines are not subject to the journalistic exception of the Directive.105 It also 
emphasized their higher obligation against any simple publisher because, as mentioned 
before, the intrusion on personal data protection and private life is more intensive.106 
Bearing in mind the criticism for the failure of the court to address the issue of freedom 
of expression, given the above, in an indirect way, it seems to address the conflict 
between the two fundamental rights. The effective protection of any fundamental right 
is mandatory regardless of the type of the court that faces the difficulty of their 
balancing, and for fulfilling this obligation in the era of GDPR, the legislation left the final 
balancing to the MS. Google Case, in contrary to other cases, it is unambiguous as to 
which right should prevail, and taking into account today’s norm to decide, the 
protection of personal data would override the internet users’ interest. The digital 
profile of the individuals through the internet gave rise to the new Regulation to further 
and explicitly enrich the protection of private life, establishing thus the “Right to be 
Forgotten”, under certain criteria.107 
 
5.1.3 Google v. CNIL and G.C. and Others v. CNIL 
Nevertheless, “Google Spain” Case, opened the path for many controversial 
issues that have arisen as a result of the recognition of the “Right to be Forgotten” 
through the above judgment. One of the issues that came to the surface is the global 
application of this right. Thus, in Case C-507/17, Google v. CNIL, the CJEU tried to 
interpret the territoriality of this right to clear the confusion of the national courts.108 In 
Case C-507/17, Google was asked by the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) to 
remove personal data that were displayed to the search results of its engine, following 
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the individual’s request.109 However, the notice for removal of those data contained the 
deletion of the data from the domain names globally and not only within the MS.110 And 
that was the reason for Google’s refusal, which found itself responsible for de-linking 
only the results from the domain names related to the MS.111 The imposition of a penalty 
for this failure of Google to fully comply with the CNIL’s request resulted in the 
challenging of the territorial scope of the Right to be Forgotten before the CJEU.112 
Examining the referred questions the CJEU firstly noted that the right to de-referencing 
is recognized under EU Legal order, which is now enriched in article 17 of the GDPR,113 
yet non-EU States may have a different perspective on it.114 In this light, the ruling of the 
CJEU was beneficial for Google, as it held that it was not obliged to delete the links 
worldwide but only those related to the EU MS.115 At the same time, the CJEU underlined 
that the widespread development of internet use on a global scale will still affect the 
persons located within the EU, thus an international de-referencing system is 
desirable.116 Furthermore, the Court noted that despite the above necessity, the right 
to the protection of personal data is qualified and a balancing against other fundamental 
rights is mandatory.117 The balancing must be done having in mind the principle of 
proportionality and the function of this right in the society.118 The difficulty arises in 
finding a fair balance between the right to personal data protection and the right to 
freedom of information of internet users which is being understood uniquely in each 
nation of the world;119 and that is the reasoning of the CJEU in limiting the Right to be 
Forgotten only within the Union. As the CJEU ruled, the aim of the legislator didn’t seem 
to be the application of the above right outside the borders of the European Union but 
the search engines should implement mechanisms that discourage or, if possible, stop 
internet users from the access to relevant links located outside the Union.120 Finally, the 
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CJEU left once again the discretion to the MS and their competent authorities to find the 
right balance between freedom of information and personal data, giving the possibility 
for a global de-referencing through their national laws.121As the CJEU stated, there is no 
requirement for global de-referencing under the Directive and subsequently the 
Regulation, yet such right is not prohibited.122 On the contrary, although difficult, it is an 
essential need in order not to diminish the “Right to be Forgotten”. 
In light of the foregoing, the C-507/17 case is problematic and controversial. As 
the adoption of GDPR aims to enhance the right to personal data protection, by having 
the CJEU ruling limiting the application of the Right to be Forgotten only within the 
European Borders, this may weaken the scope of the GDPR.123 Yet, by leaving the door 
open for the MS to find their own mechanisms for a global application of this right, it 
seems that the CJEU’s view is to follow the path for an international harmonization 
despite its obstacles.124 Undoubtedly, the public interest and the right in accessing 
information should not be eliminated or underestimated in the effort of the above 
protection. Both are fundamental rights, of huge importance in a democratic society. 
And as the CJEU stated, those vary not only from one MS to another but also to the 
nations outside the European concept;125 hence the application of both rights, differ in 
each jurisdiction. Consequently, nations must weigh up the above conflicting rights 
according to the particular circumstances of their country.  
On the same date, the CJEU examined another case C-136/17, G.C. and Others 
v. CNIL, which was a natural consequence of the “Google Spain” Case, that led to a 
massive number of requests for applying the right inferred from this judgment, known 
as the Right to be Forgotten.  In the C-136/17 Case, following a similar line to the C-
507/17 Case, the CJEU faced preliminary questions for an appeal before the French 
Council of States. The reason was that CNIL refused to notify Google for removing 
sensitive data from its links, thus the individuals affected took actions against CNIL.126 
Among the questions referred to the CJEU was whether the obligation of de-referencing 
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for requests related to information on a web page that contain sensitive data applies 
also to search engine operators.127 In other words, if the prohibition for the processing 
of personal data, under the EU legal order, with any exceptions provided, is extended to 
those operators.128 And the exception in this case, was the journalistic exception as well 
as its implementation considering the de-referencing of journalistic material.129 The 
CJEU found that the obligations under the EU Data Protection Law, referring to the 
processing of sensitive data are extended to search engine operators by the reason that 
their activities fall into the definition of processing.130 Within the above, the CJEU 
differentiated the search engine operator, which provides only the links for the access, 
from a website publisher that places the data online.131 Nonetheless, this is not 
diminishing the liability of the search engines to comply with the Directive since their 
actions affect the right to privacy and personal data protection.132As the law prescribes, 
there is a prohibition in processing sensitive data, which is subject to exceptions, that 
must also be applied by the search engines.133 Elaborating further, the Court pointed 
out that the compliance with the requirement of de-referencing the sensitive data, is 
neither automatic nor systematic. What must be done on behalf of search engine 
operators when receiving an application for de-referencing, is to balance the right to 
personal data protection and the right to freedom of information of internet users.134 
Thus, the relevant factors that must be examined are the nature of the contested 
information, its accuracy or the possibility of being outdated, the impact on the person’s 
private life and the public interest in receiving that information.135 Furthermore, the 
CJEU held that information related to criminal convictions and offences subject to a trial 
or an investigation against the individual, fall also under the scope of Data Protection 
Law, irrespective of their result.136 Accordingly, the search engine operator when faces 
an individual’s request for de-referencing, has to analyze whether the related 
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information is essential for the protection of the freedom of information of internet 
users or whether it interferes with the privacy right of the requestor; the consequences 
of the publicized information must be taken into account.137 Among those 
considerations, the assessment must be done having in mind the gravity of the offensive 
act, how much time has passed since then, the result of the proceedings, the role of the 
affected individuals in the society, their past behavior and the existence of public 
interest at the precise time of the request.138 How the publication is formed and the 
content of it is also relevant.139 Additionally, the CJEU imposed a duty to search engine 
operators in the light of the above, which is to maintain accurate data on their links and 
to follow the principle of lawfulness.140 All in all, according to Advocate General 
Szpunar,141 the search engine operators must reconcile the fundamental rights of 
privacy and personal data protection with the right of information of the internet users, 
considering at the same time if the contested information is related to the well-known 
journalistic exception.142  
The abovementioned cases challenge once again the right to private life and the 
protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and information. 
Those fundamental rights are separated by a thin thread because of their immense 
importance in the society, thus there will be a frequent conflict between them. What is 
more difficult to manage is their reconciliation in the era of the Internet and its 
transnational nature.143 Although the GDPR aims to enhance the protection of the 
personal data and the Right to be Forgotten, the fear of restricting the right to freedom 
of expression and information exists; hence the CJEU with the above judgments tried to 
limit the extraterritorial impact of the right to be forgotten, but still left the door open 
for a global recognition of this right. 
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5.1.4 Journalism and Household Exemption 
Going a step forward, regarding the exemptions allowed by article 9 of the 
Directive, the CJEU  in its judgment C-345/17, was challenged to reconcile the right to 
personal data protection with the right to freedom of expression. This case concerned a 
video publication on YouTube by Mr. Buivids, showing police officers acting improperly 
in their working environment. Hence, a complaint against him was filed because the 
police officers could be recognized since the video was showing their faces.  Due to this 
fact, Mr. Buivids was asked to delete the video.144 Mr. Buivides claimed that he deemed 
the actions of those public guards of our society inappropriate and illegal,145 and the 
publication of the video was to awake the community;146 therefore he was covered by 
the journalistic exception of the Directive that was valid at that time, which is aligned 
with the scope of the new GDPR. Following that, the Latvian Supreme Court referred to 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling to specify the arguments mentioned; if the case was under 
Data Protection Law and if the publication was falling under the journalistic exception.147 
On the first question, there was no doubt that it was falling under the scope of the 
directive as it constituted processing by automated means, and the persons in the video 
were identifiable, giving its reasoning extensively.148 The crucial part though that 
concerns us, was the second questioning, whether they could apply the journalistic 
exception in favour of Mr. Buivids. The court notably stated that the protection of 
personal data is essential but we must not disregard other fundamental rights such as 
freedom of expression, and on that account, a fair balancing between them is needed,149 
having in mind the broad definition of journalism.150 The interpretation of journalistic 
activities is not limited to professionals but, as mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, 
to each individual “that is engaged in journalism”151. In this case, the decision must be 
taken based on the individuals’ intention, if the only purpose of the publication is to 
disseminate their view for the information to the society.152 A case-by-case analysis 
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must be done and any limitation of the right to protect personal data comes with the 
need to reconcile it with the fundamental right of freedom of expression and only to the 
extent that this is unavoidable.153 Another exemption that could be applicable in this 
case was the household exception, which ceases the applicability of today’s Regulation 
for data protection. However, the accessibility to watch the video from an undefined 
number of people makes the derogation impossible on that base.154  
Despite that the case was delivered before the adoption of GDPR, the guidelines 
would be similar, as the article 9 of the Directive was almost the same as today’s article 
of the Regulation, article 85, which leaves the discretion to strike the balance on the 
abovementioned fundamental rights on the MS and their definitions. Nevertheless, 
GDPR applicability not only to professionals but also to amateurs is a red alarm that 
anything we do as individuals in our everyday life through the internet, which is the most 
widespread medium nowadays, must be filtered and limited to close friends, to avoid 
being exposed to data protection breach. So the household exception is of huge 
importance,155 finding a balance with the right to freedom of expression when this 
challenge comes at stake. Staying focused on the core of our subject, any processing of 
personal data for journalism in its broad interpretation must be legitimate as it comes 
to limit the privacy of the data subject. Conclusively, today, where every action on the 
internet entails data processing, an upload of a video similar to the one uploaded by Mr. 
Buivids, would breach the right to privacy. 
 
5.2 Implementing ECtHR judgments  
The immense amount of judgments of the ECtHR has given rise to develop and 
reinforce the European Legislation to respond adequately in the new modernized era 
that creates challenges to Human Rights across the Union.156 This chapter will touch only 
two rulings of its case law related to the tension of personal data protection against the 
right to freedom of expression. 
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5.2.1 Biriuk v. Lithuania 
A burning issue for the ECtHR is the protection of private life and any violation of 
it is condemned.157 This was the ruling of the court in the case of Biriuk v. Lithuania. As 
seen above, a critical prerequisite of balancing the right to freedom of expression 
against the privacy right is if any disclosure of personal information contributes to the 
public interest. In this case, there was a publication in a newspaper that Biriuk was 
accused to be a threat to the village she lived in as she was HIV positive, and this was 
confirmed by the hospital staff.158 Furthermore, the newspaper’s article improperly 
criticized her and contested her moral values.159 It was unambiguous that the 
newspaper violated article 8 and precisely the sensitive personal data related to Biriuk 
that should be subject to further protection as they are fundamental rights of notorious 
importance.160 The disclosure of the medical data of hers would obviously be harmful 
not only for her personal daily life but also would decrease the possibilities of her 
employment. To any further extent she would be marked by the society and as the 
newspaper wrote, as a “threat”;161 a humiliating article with undesirable consequences. 
The court undoubtedly found that this violation could not be justified as a contribution 
of public interest. The personal data of hers were an essential element for the protection 
of her private life, hence the action of the local newspaper breached her privacy, and 
the hospital missed to achieve the protection of medical confidentiality.162 MS have the 
obligation under the ECHR to protect effectively the private life of their citizens and thus, 
Lithuania failed to comply with this.163 The allegation that this would protect the people 
living nearby, meaning that it was of public interest could not be supported, and instead, 
because of the lack of knowledge related to sexually transmitted diseases would cause 
chaos to the village; consequently be harmful to the individual.164 The disseminated 
information according to the court’s judgment could not be considered lawful as a 
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debate of public interest.165 Extensively analysed, the right to freedom of expression and 
the right to privacy and personal data are two fundamental rights protected equally and 
the one should not overlap the other.166 This case should undoubtedly lean in favour of 
personal data protection; their sensitivity and the negative implication when publicized 
should not even question the fact of disseminating that information and it is profoundly 
apparent that the protection of the rights of others does not exist. The newspaper’s aim 
was the profit and the publication would only increase the thirst of the public for the 
provided information.167 The Biriuk case is not subject to any doubt of how essential it 
is to protect private life and personal data of individuals and any interference should be 
reasonably justified. 
 
5.2.2 Freedom of arts 
Freedom of expression is an integral part of a democratic society. Nevertheless, 
it is not only about publications of articles, photos or videos. It can be found in the notion 
of arts where many people create to express their feelings, opinions, and ideas. Music, 
literature, and paintings are a few examples of these. In the case of Vereinigung 
Bildender Künstler v. Austria, the ECtHR was called to clarify the debate of public interest 
connected to the above.168 In this case, an exhibition of paintings took place in a gallery 
in Austria, where the works were of contemporary art and its subject was the freedom 
of expression of the artists.169  In this exhibition, there was a painting portraying public 
persons in offending positions, showing them in sexual activities.170 One of them, Mr. 
Meischberger (Mr. M), started proceedings against the exhibition’s association with a 
request of forbidding the publication of the painting and its exhibition, by the reasoning 
that this work of art was underestimating his public standing and that dropped 
innuendos about his sexual life.171 At first, his request was accepted by the national court 
but the ECtHR had a different opinion in this balancing exercise between freedom of 
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expression and privacy;172 In contradiction with the most of the cases analysed 
previously in this thesis, the right to freedom of expression is prevailing over the 
personal life of the individuals. As repeatedly stated, MS should not restrict the right to 
freedom of expression, and if they do so any interference must be justified.173 The artists 
are expressing their views and feelings through works of art, those creations reflect their 
opinions and thus we could not restrain this right from them unduly; any interference 
should be a result of careful examination.174 The painting, as the court illustrated, 
depicted Mr. M in an extremely imaginary way, in a satirical form that could not even 
reach reality, a humorous way that aimed to criticize the political conduct of him. As 
such, this exaggeration could not reveal his personal preferences or intrude on his 
privacy. Those caricatures were meant to challenge the public figure of Mr. M, and this 
was lawful, because as being a public person, intentionally he is exposed to social 
comments. 175 Consequently, the decision of the Austrian Court was violating the right 
to freedom of expression of the association, as it was not proportionate to the aim 
seeking to achieve, therefore not essential for a democratic regime.176 As said, freedom 
of expression is also extended to expressions that may be offensive, outrageous or even 
disturbing.177 
The consideration of whether there is a fair balancing of the conflicting rights is 
obvious.  Noted in several cases, a fact analysis must be done to reconcile the various 
rights at stake, and especially when those affect individuals’ lives. But how would the 
Court decide today?  This painting with Mr. M and many others being depicted on it and 
being identifiable are subject of consideration under the GDPR. Nowadays, under article 
85 of the Regulation, the margin of appreciation is given to the MS to strike this balance. 
I believe that the autonomy of each person and the right to the protection of his 
personal data in the abovementioned case could prevail over freedom of the arts 
because this painting was offensive and unpleasant over the limits. His opinion could be 
expressed more moderately and instead of using photos of their faces, paint them in the 
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same caricature way as their bodies so as not to be easily recognizable. Nevertheless, 
freedom of expression and precisely freedom of arts, must not be underestimated as it 
is an essential element of a democratic society, yet carrying duties and responsibilities. 
Despite my view, as Eleni Polymenopoulou178 examined, the ECtHR in its case law 
supports more and more the right of freedom of the arts with the satirical way of 
expression being prevailed over other fundamental rights.179  
 
5.3 CYPRIOT DECISIONS 
5.3.1 Decision 192/2018: Decision of the Commissioner for 
Personal Data Protection, Subject: Complaint for the publication and 
processing of Personal Data by Breikot Management Ltd  
As previously stated, the Regulation left the discretion to the MS in implementing 
its obligations and seek for the right balance of the contradicting values falling under 
article 85. In the Decision 192/2018(Breikot case) the Commissioner for Personal Data 
Protection in Cyprus followed the guidelines of the above milestone judgments to reach 
its ruling. In this case, the complainants objected to a publication made by Breikot 
Management Ltd (Breikot) in a printed newspaper, which included their full names and 
photos.180 The complainants alleged, among others, the lack of public interest. In 
response to the arguments, Breikot stated that the publication was associated with a 
well-known Cypriot Family, and therefore the public interest was obvious. Moreover, 
the defendant claimed that the used photos and two relevant decisions were already 
uploaded on the internet, in a public domain, and thus they were publicly available.181  
The commissioner, having the facts of the case, initially acknowledged that the 
publication of the names and photos is regarded as processing of personal data in light 
of article 4(2) of the GDPR.182 Mentioning article 29(1) of Law 125(I) of 2018 as 
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enlightened previously, and the discretion of MS to seek a fair balance between freedom 
of expression and the protection of personal data,the commissioner highlighted that the 
right to personal data is a qualified right. For that reason, a main principle must be 
applied; the principle of proportionality. Thus, the right has to be reconciled with other 
fundamental rights and its function to society.183 The Commissioner, to approach the 
case, also referred to a decision of the Hellenic Data protection authority, which states 
among others that an ad hoc balancing of the conflicting interests must happen, having 
in mind the principle of proportionality in order for both rights to preserve their 
scope.184 Furthermore, the commissioner, linked the case with the notorious 
aforementioned decision "Google Spain", where the CJEU, referred to the journalistic 
exception of the GDPR, noting that its purpose is to give the needed freedom to the 
press to implement its commitment to inform the society in public interest matters.185 
Thus, in the Breikot case where the public interest is missing, the protection of privacy 
prevails. 186 
Moreover, the commissioner could not forget to mention the decision that we 
discussed at large previously, C-73/07.187 Every court that seeks the balance between 
freedom of expression and personal data protection, must always have in mind, before 
limiting the freedom of expression, whether the information which concerns us, already 
exists in a public domain that is publicly accessible.188 In both cases mentioned above, 
the CJEU emphasized that even if the personal data are already publicized, it does not 
change the need for their protection. The Data Protection Commissioner, taking into 
account the facts of the case and the jurisprudence of the Court, concluded that, as 
indeed the actions of the complainants had to do with public works, the full names of 
them should be publicized because of the existence of public interest.189 On the 
contrary, the publication of their photographs was unnecessary as the purpose need to 
achieve, which was the information of the public concerning those works, could be 
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accomplished only with the names’ disclosure. The publication of the photos was over 
and above the aim of seeking to achieve.190 
As seen in the above case, the jurisprudence of the court and the legislation is 
an essential part of finding a fair balance between the aforementioned rights. 
Nevertheless, the proportionality test is appropriate to find the line among those rights, 
and what we conceive from this is that any deviation or limitation of the rights must not 
exceed the necessary for the completion of the intended purpose. In conclusion, the 
journalistic exception provided by article 85 of GDPR can be applied only to the extent 
that does not exceed the arising need.  
 
5.3.2 Complaint 135/2018, “Publication of names and photos of 
police investigators at Larnaca Airport from the newspaper "Politis". 
Another Cypriot case that was found before the Data Protection Commissioner 
was the complaint 135/2018 that has as a subject “Publication of names and photos of 
police investigators at Larnaca Airport from the newspaper "Politis".”191 The complaint 
was against a publication of the newspaper, which disclosed the names of two police 
officers and their photos. The police officers were subject to criticism by the newspaper 
for pestering a Turkish Cypriot old lady,192 treating her in a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
way. And this was the reasoning of the newspaper for the publication of the 
complainants’ names, to increase the awareness of the competent authorities referring 
to the concerned issue.193 The commissioner firstly stated that the actions of the 
newspaper were processing of personal data and it should comply with certain 
conditions.194 Among others, she referred to article 85 of the GDPR and the discretion 
of the MS to balance freedom of expression with the right to protection of personal 
data.195 Following that, the reference to article 29(1) of Law 125(I) 2018 was mandatory 
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to strike this balance.  She also mentioned the case Bavarian Lager Co. v. Commission 
where the commission ensured that despite the persons at issue are workers on the 
public sector and the processing was of public interest, the Directive is still applicable; 
this approach was further upheld to the case C-101/01 Lindqvist.196 In this case, we had 
also a reference to article 19 of the Cypriot Constitution for the protection of freedom 
of expression, highlighting that the two rights must be reconciled, with prevailing one 
the freedom of expression to satisfy the public interest, only when it does not violate 
private life.197 Taking all these into account, the decision was that the disclosure of the 
names and the photos of the police officers was beyond the necessary; the journalistic 
purpose as aforementioned in this thesis is to transmit information and ideas, and this 
publication was more than that. The aim could be achieved with blurred photos and just 
the initials of the names, and still, provide the essential for the public interest.198 
Examining the above cases, where the Cypriot Data Protection Commissioner 
was called to decide whether the processing of personal data was legitimate for 
exercising journalistic activities, we observe that she followed the guidelines of the 
European Law and the Cypriot Law that was adopted after the discretion given by the 
article 85 of GDPR. Ιn order to strike a balance, importance is given to the principle of 
proportionality and the personal data minimization; that means the processing can 
happen only to the extent that completes the needed purpose and nothing more than 
that. If the purpose can be achieved by sacrificing less, then we should go that way. 
Another significant factor to consider when balancing the above is if the data subject is 
a public person of society.199 In this case, the right to freedom of expression was more 
intensive than the need for personal data protection because the intention was to fulfill 
the need to inform the public.200 The journalists, as public watchdogs, are covered by 
their duty to transmit their opinions and ideas and criticize what is happening around 
the world and if the public figures can deal properly with their given duties and 
discretions.201 Nevertheless, this is not an unlimited right, even if it is related to matters 
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that are of significant importance, or severe situations; the right of the press to inform 
must be at the same time in compliance with specific obligations.202 
CHAPTER 6: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN 
Despite the above conflicting situations, personal data protection and freedom 
of expression are interlinked and can be considered “as two sides of the same coin”. 
Without the effective protection of the one, we cannot guarantee the other since in this 
information society that we live in almost all of our communications happen through 
technology, and the tracking of activities is widespread. Having this as a fact, people will 
be afraid that they are being monitored and their private activities are subject to 
interference; as such will avoid to freely express themselves, their opinions, or 
disseminate and receive information.203  A relevant example to this relationship is the 
case of C-203/15 (Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och Telestyrelsen).204 A burning issue that 
arose in this case, was that the right to privacy and personal data was violated by the 
Data Retention Directive which retained position data and traffic data.205 By the holding 
of the personal data of individuals without informing them and obtaining their consent, 
it had as a consequence the creation of a feeling of fear that their private sphere was 
monitored in every step.206 The CJEU found that this retention was not only in breach 
with articles 7 and 8 of the Charter but also with the right to freedom of expression as 
the feeling that they were monitored continually, was affecting negatively their 
communication by electronic means. Thus, it has as a result to withhold them from 
exercising this fundamental right,207 which is necessary for every democratic nation, and 
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any restriction from its exercise should be lawful and reasonably justified.208 
Consequently, enforcing strict protection in the light of the Data Retention Directive 
limits the right to privacy and thus, the right to freedom of expression. Therefore, the 
protection of privacy and personal data is necessary to guarantee the right arising from 
the article 11 of the Charter.209  
This case is an overturn on what we described in this thesis extensively; The 
findings of the court in each occasion for the conflict of the above rights are not 
absolute, and not always incompatible with each other. Both rights are indispensable in 
our society; they are fundamental rights that each one separately and together deserve 
equal protection to allow people to enjoy their benefits.210 The autonomy of the 
individuals without any intrusion is an essential component for preserving their privacy 
and freedom of expression, as well as be able to create and hold their own opinions or 
even disseminate them, in every sector of their life.211 Moreover, any interference to 
the private sphere of the individuals by observing their lives, limits them from expressing 
themselves freely. The same is applicable for the journalists if they are subject to 
surveillance or control by the state, which will prevent them from exercising their 
activities in this sector and their freedom of expression will be eliminated from this 
constant monitoring.212 As mentioned above, online surveillance is possible in every 
action by the providers even without our consent. The adverse effect of this is obvious; 
deprivation of privacy and fear of exercising the right to freedom of expression. 
Subsequently, each of those rights is necessary for preserving the other.213 
Nevertheless, the link among those rights is mostly entailed in the communications 
sector, where violation of the one damages the other; thus, individuals hesitate to 
involve and take part in social life. This illustrates the importance, the necessity and the 
great achievement of the European Union and the Charter of Human Rights for their 
protection. In this sense, the innovation of GDPR, which allows anonymity of expression 
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in every channel through the ability of encryption, boosts this right and consequently 
adds to the safeguarding of a democratic society, preserving the human dignity.214 Of 
course, almost every Act has an adverse effect, and a major concern in the encryption 
and anonymity concept is that illegal actions may be supported. Nonetheless, the law 
provided adequate safeguards on those actions so the encryption is not absolute. As 
people can maintain their anonymity, without interference in their private sphere, the 
enhancement of the right to freedom of expression is a fact.  As we have seen, the right 
to personal data and freedom of expression are not always in conflict; they sometimes 
need each other to survive, and this need arises mostly in the communication sector. 
Conclusions 
In an era where the modern world faces many challenges and violations in every 
fundamental freedom and value because of the radical changes around us, the quality 
of our lives is at risk. Those inherent Human Rights are an integral part of preserving this 
quality and we must not underestimate the efforts of the European Union and the 
International Law to enhance the protection of those rights through its legislation. Thus, 
having these constant efforts, we would expect that each fundamental right, which is 
subject to equal protection, would not be able to damage or violate the other. 
Nevertheless, as we extensively discussed above, sometimes the conflict between some 
of those integral values is inevitable not only because of their nature but also the 
information technology and development that arose in the last years. As described in 
this thesis, one of the major conflicts that comes at stake is the battle between the right 
to freedom of expression and the right to the protection of personal data, subsequently 
the right to privacy. Α crucial question up to the above is whether the Protection of 
personal data can restrict the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. In the year 
2019, the expression of opinions and ideas and the dissemination of information are not 
limited in a printed paper but can be uploaded on the internet, be accessible to an 
unlimited number of people and stay there for an undefined time. This easy and 
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effortless way of exercising the right to freedom of expression generates risks to privacy 
and the protection of personal data.215 Nowadays, in every modern communication 
method and the use of social media,the processing of personal data is not missing.216 
And that is the reason for the creation, or in other words, the replacement of the 
Directive and the adoption of GDPR, to fit the digital period of today. The legislator 
acknowledging that the right to freedom of expression and the right to the protection 
of personal data are equivalent rights and none of the two is subject to better 
protection, laid down article 85 of this Regulation. Knowing that those two values are 
equivalent and must be respected in the same way and with the same importance, we 
conceive that the protection of the one cannot prevail over the other. Hence, what must 
be done is to find the line in which both rights can work in parallel; their fair balancing 
is mandatory. There is no single answer of how to tackle the conflict between the above; 
unlimited aspects exist that we should consider. Having the unique facts of each case, 
sometimes the fair balancing may be to limit the exercise of freedom of expression, or 
to accept interference on the individuals’ privacy and hence their personal data. The 
CJEU in the case Bodil Lindqvist, in its ruling stated that through the Directive we 
perceive that a prevailing step is given to the right of the protection of personal data.217 
Furthermore, in the light of today’s norm, the GDPR, where the processing of data is 
possible only when it is compatible with the provisions of the Regulation and only if the 
exemptions laid down are applicable, the priority is given to the data protection. Albeit, 
the aspects for consideration are unlimited and the final step is left to the MS to reach 
this balance and find in which right must be given more weight in each case. MS are 
obliged to reconcile those rights having in mind the discretion given under article 85 of 
the Regulation, interpreting it step by step as analysed on the above cases. The first step 
must be to define the notion of journalism and then its necessity for this balancing.  
 A reason for allowing interference with the right to protect personal data is 
whether the person that is subject to this intrusion is a public figure, and as said, public 
persons, having this capacity, are exposed to this interference. Moreover, the 
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interference on the right to privacy arises lawfully when the matter at stake is a matter 
of public interest. Nevertheless, in the cases where the personal data accept any 
intrusion, the principle of proportionality should be respected, and as such their 
accuracy. On the other side of the coin, a crucial element on this balancing is the nature 
of those intruded data. The more sensitive they are, the more protection they gain.  
Conclusively, taking into account the jurisprudence of the Courts evaluated in 
this thesis, the protection of personal data seems to have an advantage against the right 
to freedom of expression, especially in the modern technologies where the 
communication has developed massively, and the personal data are vulnerable to 
increased threats. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the right to freedom of 
expression is essential and almost absolute to maintain a democratic nation, and this is 
the reason that creates the extensive need for the reconcilement of those two rights. At 
the same time, the right to protection of personal data and the right to freedom of 
expression are interlinked, mainly in the communications sector, and consequently, the 
adequate safeguard of the one safeguards the other. The guarantee of each Human 
Right, together with others, or separately, is indispensable for guaranteeing Human Life. 
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